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On the Impact of HOT Lane Tolling Strategies 
on Total Traffic Level
by Soheil Sibdari and Mansoureh Jeihani
This	paper	shows	how	tolling	(or	pricing)	strategies	can	be	used	to	control	the	congestion	levels	of	
both	untolled	and	high	occupancy	toll	(HOT)	lanes.	Using	a	user-equilibrium	method,	the	paper	
calculates	the	number	of	travelers	on	each	route	during	the	peak	period	and	provides	a	numerical	
analysis	that	determines	the	distribution	of	travelers	for	different	tolling	strategies.	It	shows	that	
with	the	right	tolling	strategy	some	travelers	who	initially	plan	to	use	the	untolled	lane	during	the	
peak	period	will	change	both	their	routes	(i.e.,	select	the	HOT	lane)	and	departure	times	(i.e.,	depart	
earlier	or	later).	Using	this	result,	the	paper	compares	static	and	dynamic	pricing	strategies	and	
shows	that	with	a	dynamic	strategy	a	 larger	profit	can	be	earned	and	congestion	reduced	in	 the	
untolled	lane.
INTRODUCTION
Traffic congestion is a serious problem in urban areas, challenging transportation policymakers and 
raising the total cost of transportation. Traffic demand management has become an increasingly 
popular tool for managing congestion. This approach assumes travel demand is a quantity 
requested by road users whose size and distribution can be controlled by different policies. These 
policies include congestion pricing, flexible work hours, carpooling, and public transportation. 
Many congestion pricing studies have developed policies that simply maximize expected profit 
or maintain an acceptable level of congestion for a high occupancy toll (HOT) lane. However, 
many transportation planners are more concerned with reducing congestion levels than maximizing 
profits, and would benefit from a pricing policy that changes a traveler’s behavior and significantly 
lowers overall congestion.
 Some researchers, including Small and Yan (2001) and Fielding and Klein (1993), have 
addressed the concept of value pricing, which lets travelers choose between a free but congested 
lane and a priced but free-flowing roadway. Also called HOT lanes, these priced roadways allow 
single drivers to pay for more highly valued services. HOT lanes currently in use in the United States 
include Interstate 15 in San Diego, Quick Ride System on the Katie Highway and the Northwest 
Freeway in Houston, and the SR 91 Express Lanes in Orange County, California (Evans et al. 1993).
Value pricing can also solve some of the problems associated with high occupancy vehicle 
(HOV) lanes, such as when they become congested from vehicles  with two passengers (HOV-2), 
while those HOV lanes allowing vehicles with at least three passengers (HOV-3) are underutilized. 
HOT lanes allow single occupant vehicles (SOVs) to enter a lane by paying a toll, while carpools or 
buses can use the same lanes for free or at a discounted rate. Allowing SOVs to use HOV lanes via 
an appropriate toll can control congestion and generate profit for the toll-road operators.
The existing pricing literature considers profit maximization, second-best pricing, social 
welfare maximization, and a minimum level of service requirement as objectives in their model 
development. A second-best pricing policy maximizes social welfare subject to a zero-toll constraint 
on the alternative roadways. The optimal solution for this policy is a weighted average of the 
marginal external congestion costs between non-carpooling and carpooling vehicles. Profit (or 
revenue) maximization allows a planner to maximize profit subject to a zero-toll constraint on other 
roads. Small and Yan (2001) compared profit maximization and revenue maximization and found 
that travelers’ behaviors under both policies are almost identical. They also compared the outcomes 
of profit maximization and second-best pricing, and showed that profit maximization sets higher 
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tolls and lowers total social benefits. Another type of pricing regime, maintaining service level, sets 
the toll high enough to keep the flow of the priced roadway at a minimum specified speed. Similar 
to second-best pricing, this objective achieves social optimum and has an additional constraint that 
guarantees a minimum level of service in the express lane. A detailed review of these pricing policies 
is provided by Yang and Huang (1999), Braid (1996) and Verhoef et al. (1996).
Unlike the literature above, this paper examines the effect of HOT lane pricing on the congestion 
level of a regular lane, i.e., untolled lane. It investigates a situation where a regular lane is congested 
during the peak (i.e., 5-6 p m.) and the HOT lane is under-utilized during the shoulders of the peak 
period (i.e., 3-4 p.m. or 7-8 p.m.). It shows that an appropriate toll motivates some travelers who 
plan to use the untolled lane during the peak period to use the HOT lane during the shoulders of 
the peak. To illustrate, consider a regular and a HOT lane of the same length and free-flow traffic 
times connecting two points. The toll for the HOT lane is $3 from 4-5 p m. and $6 from 5-6 p m. A 
traveler, who plans to depart at 5 p.m. and is not willing to pay $6, might change her travel time to 
4 p.m. to take advantage of the HOT lane’s light traffic and $3 rate. This behavior smoothes out the 
departure rate during the peak period and lowers the regular lane’s traffic.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Most studies on value pricing use either static or dynamic models. Static pricing assumes that travel 
demand and costs are not time sensitive. As a result, the inter-temporal impact of tolls on long-term 
congestion levels is not considered. Many studies in this area use marginal cost pricing to estimate 
an optimal congestion price on transportation networks. This pricing policy makes peak period 
travel more expensive with a toll that is calculated as the difference between marginal social and 
private costs.
Dafermos and Sparrow (1971) used static congestion pricing to determine the optimal toll for 
general transportation networks. Yang and Meng (1998) calculated static congestion pricing using 
the marginal social and private costs of travel, where roads are modeled as bottlenecks. Unlike 
static congestion pricing, dynamic pricing methods affect travel demand, travel costs, and toll levels 
over time. A seminal paper by Vickrey (1969) introduced a dynamic congestion-pricing model 
for a single bottleneck with a fixed capacity and number of travelers. He took into account work-
related trips and assumed the same desired departure times for all travelers. However, some travelers 
could change their departure times to avoid traffic congestion. If a traveler left early, she faced no 
congestion, but could possibly encounter costs associated with early arrival. If she left to arrive on 
time, she could also face congestion that would make her late. Vickrey (1969) showed that in these 
situations equilibrium congestion occurred when no driver could reduce her trip cost by changing 
her departure time.
Arnott et al. (1993) extended Vickrey’s model by considering heterogeneous travelers. They 
developed a deterministic mathematical model to establish the efffect of an optimal time-varying toll 
on social welfare. They also compared the impact of different tolling schemes, such as uniform and 
step-functions on system efficiency. With a time-dependent congestion toll and optimal congestion 
pricing, they achieved a more uniform departure rate and reduced both congestion cost and traveling 
time for commuters. 
Arnott et al. (1990) also considered fixed demand in a network with parallel routes, and 
used dynamic traffic assignment to examine the impact of different pricing regimes on network 
congestion and reproduced hypercritical flow conditions. Carey and Srinivasan (1993) used non-
linear programming to address system marginal costs, user externality costs, and optimal congestion 
tolling and developed optimal tolls under a time-dependent travel demand. They compared optimal 
dynamic and static tolls and found that optimal dynamic tolls depended on the congestion level 
and whether the congestion was at the beginning or ending of a peak period. Yang and Huang 
(1999) developed a time-varying pricing model for a road bottleneck when demand is elastic and 
deterministic. They used a continuous-time optimal control approach to maximize social benefit. 
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Liu and McDonald (1999) used economic and simulation models to compare first-best, second-best, 
and no-toll policies in a model with two routes and periods (peak and pre-peak). They found that 
second-best pricing policies are effective in reallocating traffic volumes, but less effective than first-
best tolling. The toll level in the second-best pricing policy is lower than in a first-best tolling policy, 
and the social welfare benefit obtained from the second-best tolling policy is smaller than the gains 
from a first-best tolling policy. 
All the papers reviewed manage traffic on a route by pricing it to maximize expected revenue 
or social welfare and make route demand (i.e., the number of passengers that use the route) solely 
a function of the price, thus neglecting the linkage between price and demand on alternative routes. 
To fill this gap, this paper addresses this linkage and uses a traffic assignment method that considers 
the prices charged on alternative routes. The problem is modeled from the perspective of a social 
planner whose objective is to control congestion. A prime factor impacting our model is the presence 
of travelers who adjust their departure times with respect to a route’s price level. Considering this 
factor, the planner can manage total congestion by charging approppriate tolls. The section below 
addresses the problem and presents the traffic assignment method used. After that, a numerical 
analysis is conducted to determine the distribution of travelers during the peak period under different 
pricing policies followed by conclusions.
MODEL
Consider two roadways that connect points A and B. They have the same length, L, and free-flow 
travel time, FFTT. One is toll-free (NT) and the other is tolled (T). The only points of access and 
egress for both roadways are A and B, and travelers can only choose between these two routes to 
travel from A to B. HOVs can use both roadways for free, but SOVs can only use NT for free and 
must pay to use the HOT lane.
Next, consider a total of N travelers in SOVs with home-based-work (HBW) trips who plan to 
travel from A to B during the peak period. HBW trips, usually made by SOVs, are most important 
during peak periods because they are less flexible in departure times since each person must arrive 
at work at a certain time. The length of the peak period is n,	and it is divided into n time slots with 
unit lengths. Without loss of generality, consider an odd number of periods from  3-8 p.m., giving 
five time slots, 3-4, 4-5, 5-6, 6-7, and 7-8 respectively.
Each traveler has a preferred departure time, and since only HBW trips are considered, assume 
that all travelers prefer a specific time slot, say time slot zero. Depending on the congestion level 
and toll, travelers might change their departure times if those times increase their disutilities of 
travel. Next, assume D = [D
-2
, D
-1
, D
0
, D
1
, D
2
] is the vector of disutilities associated with each time 
slot, where D
1	
determines the disutility of traveling in time slot i, for i = -2,-1,0,1,2. The size of this 
disutility is the same for all travelers, but varies by departure time. For example, departing in time 
slot zero imposes no disutility, while traveling in the other time slots imposes positive disutility, with 
the disutility of traveling in later time slots being greater than traveling in earlier time slots. However, 
the disutility of traveling in time slot -1 is not necessarily equal to the disutility of traveling in time 
slot 1. This is also true for time slots -1, 2, and 2. In addition to disutility, travel time and the toll 
level affect a traveler’s cost, and travelers choose a roadway and time slot to minimize their costs. 
To analyze the problem described, the paper relies on a traffic assignment model to find an 
equilibrium solution that specifies the number of travelers on each roadway and in each time slot. 
A wide range of traffic assignment models can be employed to assign traffic flow between an origin 
and a destination among different routes, with system optimal and user equilibrium being the most 
popular. System optimal models find an assignment that minimizes total network travel time based 
upon the assumption that travelers cannot change their route without increasing total system travel 
time. In the user equilibrium model adopted in this study, travelers cannot improve their travel time 
by switching routes. Using the Frank and Wolfe (1956) algorithm, all flows are assigned to the initial 
shortest path and the links are iteratively updated using a volume delay function, which shows the 
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relationship between the cost of traversing a link and the flow on it. The algorithm then finds a new 
shortest path between each origin and destination and assigns a convex combination of flow to the
new and old shortest paths. 
The above traffic assignment method is used to calculate the demand for each time slot. For 
a given price menu, the equilibrium number of travelers on each route where no travelers have an 
incentive to change their departure time or their route choice is determined. By changing price, the 
distribution of passengers among these time slots changes because some passengers change their 
routes or departure times. This change allows the model to determine the impact of each roadway’s 
price on travel on the other roadways. Several factors impact a traveler’s route choice, such as travel 
cost, costs of using alternative routes, discomfort associated with a route, or time of travel. The cost 
of travel includes out-of-pocket costs (e.g., gas, parking fees, and tolls). Since the study is on the
effect of tolls and time of travel on travel behavior, the effects of gas price and parking fees are not 
considered. For discomfort, it is assumed that time slot 0 has no disutility, and the disutilities of the 
other time slots increase with distance from this slot.
To apply the algorithm, the links and their generalized cost functions are defined. Each time 
slot (T and NT) is treated as a separate link, and the volume delay function for each time slot i and 
roadway j is defined as follows.
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where:
 
  :  generalized cost of travel on each link. 
D
i	
:  cost associated with the disutility of choosing time slot i rather than time  
    slot zero. Note that the values of  D
i	
are the same for both roadways.
  :  free-flow travel time (in minutes), which is calculated as follows.
 
 :  capacity during time slot i in roadway j.
p
i	
:  toll level during time slot i in roadway T.
 :  the flow during time slot i in roadway j.
L	 :  length of the links (in miles).
 :  free-flow speed of the links (in miles per hour).
α, β, δ, γ, and φ are the parameters of the model.
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If a road is so congested during time slot i that its travel time is greater than the length of that 
time slot, then all the vehicles cannot clear that slot. In this situation, the overflowing vehicles will 
enter the next time slot. The flow of each link,     , can then be calculated using: 
(2)  ji
j
i
j
i OVV 1= +
where jiV  is the initial flow in time slot i on roadway j, and is the overflow of traffic from time 
slot i - 1 to time slot i on roadway j. It is assumed that for all  and the following equation is 
used to calculate :
 j
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The volume delay function in Equation 1 is the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) function with 
generalized cost, which uses travel time as the cost of traversing a link. This link travel time can be 
calculated using the free-flow travel time of a link and the ratio of link flow to capacity. However, 
the BPR function with generalized cost assumes that traversing a link conveys costs other than 
link travel time. These costs are presumed to be the possible toll and disutility of selecting a time 
slot over time slot 0. The applied Frank-Wolfe algorithm can be explained using the following 
procedure:
1. Initialization: Perform all-or-nothing assignment based on . This gives the flow 
vector . Set the iteration number m to 1.
2. Update Travel Cost: Update the link travel cost .
3. Direction finding: Perform all-or-nothing assignment with the updated . This gives 
the auxiliary flow vector )(mY ji .
4. Line Search: Find the solution to .
5. Move: Set the flows to   ))()(()(=1)( mVmYmVmV ji
j
i
j
i
j
i ++ λ . 
6. Convergence Test: If λ < ε stop; otherwise go to Step 2, where ε is a very small number 
(e.g., 0.0001). 
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The algorithm yields an equilibrium solution in which travelers are distributed among the 2n links 
with minimized possible cost and all links have the same cost. Since each link represents a time slot 
and a roadway, the N travelers are distributed among each time slot on a toll-free or tolled lane so 
that they experience the same travel cost.
NUMERICAL STUDY
The simulation model was validated and calibrated using the Trans-CAD platform. The calibrated 
model provided information on total congestion on each road in each scenario. Using this information, 
total travel time, total cost of travelers, and the revenue generated by the tolls were calculated. A 
total of N = 20,000 travelers are assumed to travel from an origin to a destination by the regular and 
HOT lanes during the five-hour period noted. As in the previous section, there are 10 lanes of the 
same length ( Lji =10miles), capacity (Cap
j
i = 2250vehicles per hour per lane), and free-flow speed
( FFS ji = 65  miles per hour) for all time slots and roadway combinations. Each lane is assigned to a 
time slot and each traveler has 10 route choices. For example, the first lane can be considered as time 
slot 3-4 p m. in the regular lane. 
Calibration and Validation of Simulation Model
To accurately perform the simulation, the model’s parameters are estimated by calibration. This 
technique develops travel demand by estimating various parameters and examining the ability of the 
model to replicate actual traffic patterns.1 This is done by solving the equations for the parameters of 
interest by supplying the observed values of the variables from surveys and experimental analysis 
and by trial and error to find the values of the parameters with the largest probability of being 
accurate within an acceptable margin of error (i.e., within 0.5% of actual values). After satisfactory 
parameters are obtained, the model’s performance is checked by comparing the observed and 
simulated travel times and traffic counts.
iFFTT
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The paper also uses the calibration results in Jeihani et al. (2008). These authors used a corridor 
of Interstate 83 in Baltimore, Maryland, and calibrated demand parameters iteratively by comparing 
the outputs of their models with observed data. In each iteration, the parameters were adjusted to 
replicate the observed condition. Then, following Oketch and Carrick (2005), they used a modified 
Chi-square test based upon the difference between the simulation model’s output and observed 
traffic counts to test their results. At the 5% level of significance, they could not reject the hypothesis 
that their model adequately simulated the traffic flow patterns. Similarly, to estimate travel time 
parameters and disutility levels, the results of Jehani et al. (2008) are used and we assume that α = 
0.5, β = 4 and the disutility vector is D = [28,20,0,15,250].
The demand parameters, including δ, φ, and γ are estimated following the approaches in Litman 
(2008) and Kumar et al. (2004), which are based on arc elasticities of demand. Also, using the same 
variables as in these authors’ works, the estimated generalized cost function is as follows: 
j
(4)      
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Equation 4 is used for the rest of the numerical study.
Base Cases
To determine the initial distribution of travelers among different time slots, the first consideration 
is what happens when the HOT lane does not exist (No-HOT-Lane). The next is to consider when a 
HOT lane is available for free, and all travelers, including SOVs, can use the extra lane (Free-HOT-
Lane). Given that during the peak period (3-8 p.m.), more passengers prefer to depart in the middle 
time slots (e.g., 5-6 p.m.), it seems reasonable to expect normal distribution of travelers in these 
cases. This distribution enables us to study the impact of only departure time on route choice.  For 
example, in the case of No-HOT-lane, the consumers’ generalized cost function consists of departure 
time disutility and travel time since travelers can choose among five time slots for the regular lane. 
The results are presented in Table 1. The first set of columns shows road type and time slots, and the 
second and third sets are the results for the No-HOT-Lane and Free-HOT-Lane scenarios. Further, 
the table is divided into two sets of rows, one for the regular lane and the other for the HOT lane. 
Four parameters are reported for each time slot: number of vehicles (flow), volume-capacity ratio 
(VOC), travel time (TT), and average speed of vehicles (speed).
As expected, the distribution of travelers among time slots follows normal distribution, with 
more travelers departing in time slot 0 (5-6 p m.). In the No-HOT-lane case, all time slots in the 
regular lane are over-utilized, with the volume-capacity ratio ranging from 1.68 to 2.3. The length 
of each time slot of 60 minutes is exceeded in all the time slots, which means that some cars overflow 
into the next time slot. For example, in time slot -2, where the flow is 3,772 vehicles per hour and 
travel time is 91.4 minutes, the road will not be cleared for travelers who depart from 3-4 p m., and 
some of them will continue their trips into time slot -1. Using Equation 2, the total overflow of time 
slot -2 is 495 vehicles, and this has been added to . Thus,   3,935+ 495 = 
4,430. The over-utilized and overflow time slots are highlighted with light and dark shadows, 
respectively. 
Based on the length of each time slot and the estimated parameters, the free flow travel time is 
18.46 minutes. In Table 1, the travel times of all time slots exceed 60 minutes, with the highest being 
time slot zero (155 minutes). The average speed of vehicles is also as low as 8 miles per hour while 
the free flow speed is 65 miles per hour. Note that the disutilities of using different time slots are 
D = [28,20,0,15,25], which means departing earlier induces higher disutilities than departing later. 
The values of the disutilities give a distribution skewed toward the left (higher flows in slots 1 and 
2 compared with slots -1 and -2 even without considering the overflows).
HOT Lane Tolling Strategies
125
Table 1: Flow, Travel Time, and Speed of Time Slot
Speed
Road
Perioda Flow
No-HOT-Lane
VOCb TTc Speed Flow
Free-HOT-Lane
VOC TT Speed
Regular
Lane
HOT
Lane
-2 (3-4)
-1 (4-5)
0 (5-6)
1 (6-7)
2 (7-8)
-2 (3-4)
-1 (4-5)
0 (5-6)
1 (6-7)
2 (7-8)
3772
4430
5179
5069
4605
-
-
-
-
-
1.68
1.97
2.3
2.25
2.05
-
-
-
-
-
91.40
104.84
154.74
114.94
96.48
-
-
-
-
-
13.13
11.45
7.75
10.44
12.44
-
-
-
-
-
915
2056
3001
2351
1683
920
2050
3004
2354
1673
0.40
0.91
1.33
1.05
0.76
0.41
0.91
1.34
1.05
0.75
18.79
24.90
47.66
29.47
21.49
18.68
24.82
47.80
29.51
21.51
64.46
48.19
25.18
40.72
55.84
64.34
48.34
25.10
40.66
55.84
a There are five time slots for each road. The first time slot is 3-4 p m., and we label it as time slot   
  -2. The other time slots are labeded accordingly. 
b If  VOC
i
  ≥ 0.9 (or the flow of a time slot exceeds 1835), the time slot i is considered over-utilized
  (indicated by light shadow). 
c If TT
i
  ≥ 60, then the road i has an overflow, (indicated with dark shading). 
For the rest of our numerical analysis, HOT lane is added and the results compared in terms of 
the impact of different pricing scenarios on total traffic level. First, consider a benchmark scenario 
where the HOT lane is available for free, i.e., p = 0. When SOVs can use the HOT lane for free, it 
can be treated as a newly constructed regular roadway. The second set of columns in Table 1 shows 
the traffic flow, VOC, travel time, and speed among five time slots of both lanes. A roadway is over-
utilized if  VOC ≥ 0.9.  Since the HOT lane is free, roadway use is almost even, with three over-
utilized time slots (1, 0 and -1) and two under-utilized time slots (2 and -2). The traffic flow is still 
normally distributed, and more travelers use time slot zero than the others. Since we assumed that 
the disutility of departing earlier is higher than later, the distribution is skewed toward the left, which 
means that  and  for j = T, NT. Because of low demand for time slots 2 and -2, the 
travelers can enjoy the free-flow travel time of 18 minutes, while the travel time in other time slots 
increases with volume. The Highway Capacity Manual (2000) grades the quality or level of service 
(LOS) of transportation facilities on an A-F scale, with “A” being the best and “F” the worst. Based 
on that manual, the LOS of time slots minus 2, -1, 0, 1, 2 are A, C, D, C, and A, respectively.
Static Strategy
In this section, a fixed price is used for the HOT lane during the peak period (3-8 p.m.). Although 
a static pricing plan does not give the planner the ability to control the traffic or maximize revenue, 
this type of pricing saves costs with infrequent price changes. With dynamic tolls, the planner needs 
more equipment to control the toll and announce it to travelers. Static tolls help travelers choose 
their routes before approaching the entrance of  HOT lane.
However, there are some disadvantages with fixed tolls. The inability to use price as a tool to 
control traffic or to maximize profit is significant. In addition, the constraint of having a certain level 
of service in the HOT lane makes the fixed toll policy less attractive: a low toll makes the HOT lane 
over-utilized and increases the possibilty that traffic in the middle time slots will rise to unacceptable 
levels, and a high toll encourages travelers to avoid the HOT lane in the shoulder time slots (i.e., 
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time slots -2, 2), leading to their under-utilization. To illustrate, Table 2 provides a numerical study 
of  two different toll levels ($1 and $2) over the peak period.
Table 2: Static Pricing Comparison
Road Static 1 Static 2
Type Period Flow VOCa TT Speed Flow VOC TT Speed
-2 (3-4) 2272 1.01 28.06 42.77 2632 1.17 35.76 33.56
Regular -1 (4-5) 2594 1.15 34.78 34.50 2890 1.28 43.60 27.53
Lane 0 (5-6) 3295 1.46 60.90 19.70 3505 1.56 72.85 16.47
1 (6-7) 2783 1.24 40.06 29.96 3045 1.35 49.44 24.27
2 (7-8) 2388 1.06 30.18 39.76 2734 1.21 38.58 31.11
-2 (3-4) 86 0.04 18.46 65.00 10 0.01 18.46 65.00
HOT -1 (4-5) 1703 0.77 21.68 55.35 904 0.40 18.70 64.16
Lane 0 (5-6) 2706 1.22 38.93 30.82 2476 1.10 32.22 37.25
1 (6-7) 2065 0.93 25.27 47.49 1782 0.80 22.27 53.89
2 (7-8) 108 0.05 18.46 65.00 19 0.01 18.46 65.00
aIf VOC ≥ 1, then the road is congested (indicated by shaded cells). 
These two cases are Static 1 and Static 2, respectively. Compared to the Free-HOT-Lane case, 
fewer travelers use the HOT lane because it is no longer free. In both cases, the regular lane is over-
utilized, and there is one case of overflow in time slot zero. The travel time of time slot zero is 60.9 
minutes and causes 18 travelers to overflow into the next time slot. The time slots with overflow are 
highlighted with dark shadows.
Both cases result in the HOT lane not meeting its minimum level of service (VOC ≤ 0.9). 
Because the tolls are not high enough to prevent a large number of travelers from using time slots 
-1, 0, 1 the HOT lane is underutilized during the shoulder time slots and over-utilized in the middle 
time slots. 
Compared with the Free-HOT-Lane case, the flows on the regular lane in Static 1 and Static 2 
are large, with a VOC of 0.4 - 1.33 in the Free HOT lane (Table 1) and VOC from 1.17 - 1.56 in the 
Static 2 case (Table 2). On the other hand, the number of HOT lane travelers in time slots -2 and 2 
drops significantly, with VOC near 0 in the shoulder time slots of Static 1 and Static 2 versus a VOC 
of 0.75 in the shoulder time slot of the Free-HOT-lane case.
A $2 toll results in some travelers leaving earlier or later to pay no toll and enjoy the better LOS 
in the regular lane during time slots -2 and 2. When Static 1 and Static 2 are compared, it is clear that 
those travelers who prefer to use the middle time slots in Static1 change their travel times in Static 
2 and use the shoulder time slots. For instance, the difference between  in Static 2 and Static 
1 is 0.16 while the difference between  in Static 2 and Static 1 is 0.1, suggesting that higher 
tolls make travelers choose shoulder times. This fact implies that some travelers will alter their route 
choices and departure times if the right toll is charged. 
Dynamic Strategy
The previous section showed that a fixed toll during the peak period does not efficiently allocate 
travelers among the time slots. When the shoulder time slots of the HOT lane are almost empty, a 
high fixed toll leads to the over-utilization of the middle time slots and violates the minimum LOS 
in a few cases. On the other hand, a low fixed toll causes the HOT lane to be over-utilized for most 
time slots. To cope with this problem, a dynamic policy is employed. 
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Table 3: Dynamic Pricing: Comparing Basic and Proposed Model
Road
Type
Period Flow
Dynamic 1 
 p = [1, 2, 4, 2,1]
VOCa TT Speed
Dynamic 2
p = [0.8, 1.7, 3.5, 2, ,0.6]
Flow VOC TT Speed
-2 (3-4) 2546 1.13 33.60 35.71 2350 1.04 29.45 40.75
Regular -1 (4-5) 2813 1.25 41.02 29.25 2646 1.18 36.12 33.23
Lane 0 (5-6) 3447 1.53 69.31 17.31 3072 1.37 50.54 23.74
1 (6-7) 3158 1.33 47.17 25.44 2876 1.28 43.10 27.84
2 (7-8) 2656 1.18 36.38 32.99 2450 1.09 31.44 38.17
-2 (3-4) 898 0.40 18.70 64.19 1147 0.51 19.08 62.88
HOT -1 (4-5) 1043 0.46 18.89 63.53 1227 0.55 19.28 62.25
Lane 0 (5-6) 1609 0.72 20.88 57.48 1839 0.82 22.58 53.13
1 (6-7) 1373 0.61 19.74 60.78 1410 0.63 19.89 60.35
2 (7-8) 626 0.28 18.52 64.81 983 0.44 18.80 63.84
aIf VOC ≥ 1, then the road is congested (indicated by shaded cells). 
To study the performance of the existing toll strategies, the toll menu in effect on Interstate 15 
in San Diego, California, are used (I-15 FasTrak Program 2005). In this menu, the toll levels of time 
slots -2, -1, 0, 1, and 2 were fixed at $1, $2, $4, $2, and $1, respectively, or  p = [1, 2, 4, 2, 1]. This is 
called Dynamic 1 in this study. Table 3 illustrates the results for two different toll menus (Dynamic 
1 and Dynamic 2) where the first set of columns illustrates the results for Dynamic 1. Due to the 
high prices charged in all the time slots, many travelers use the regular lane, and the HOT lane is 
underutilized.
The VOC of the HOT lane ranges from 0.28 to 0.72, and, except for one time slot, the average 
speed is above 60 miles per hour, which is very close to the free flow speed. However, the regular 
lane is over-utilized, with VOC as high as 1.53 in time slot 0. Time slot 0 also has an overflow of 
170 travelers because the travel time is greater than 60 minutes.
When p = [0.8, 1.7, 3.5, 2, 0.6], hereafter Dynamic 2, the utilization of the HOT lane increases 
significantly and congestion on the regular lane is reduced. The VOC of the shoulder time slots of 
the HOT lane increases from 0.28 to 0.44, while the overall VOC of the HOT lane remains in the 
accepted range.
The traffic flow on the regular lane in the Dynamic 2 decreases by 1,056 travelers compared to 
Dynamic 1. More middle time slot travelers switch routes since  deceases by 0.12, while 
and  decrease by 0.9. Many of these travelers also change their travel times. The 
1,056 travelers who switch routes use time slots -1, 2, -2 instead of time slots minus 1, 0, 1. The 
VOC of slots -2, 2 increases by 0.11 and 0.16, respectively, compared to increases of 0.02 and 0.08, 
respectively, for time slots -1, 1. This shows that assessing an appropriate toll makes more travelers 
change their travel times and depart when there is less traffic. This results in less congestion on the 
regular lane and increases HOT lane utilization while maintaining the minimum level of service.
Table 4 compares the performace of the different pricing policies and summarizes other factors 
(i.e., total profit from toll collection, consumer generalized cost, average travel time of consumers, 
and total overflow). As expected, total profits in the No-HOT-Lane and Free-HOT-Lane cases are 0. 
Interestingly enough, although Dynamic 2 significantly reduces generalized cost and average travel 
time, the planner gains almost as much profit as using Dynamic 1. The average generalized cost 
for consumers is very high in the base model where one less lane is available for the travelers. But 
consumers enjoy the lowest generalized cost in the Free-HOT-Lane case because two free lanes are 
available.
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Table 4: Comparing the Performances of Different Tolling Policies
Type Profit
Consumer 
Cost
Avg. TT E(TT - FFTT)2 Overflow
NO HOT lane 0 47.55 113.75 132.08 3055
Free HOT lane 0 18.37 31.63 14.33 0
Static 1 6667.79 19.67 36.86 18.07 18
Static 2 10385.48 20.48 43.43 24.92 228
Dynamic 1 12794.80 27.17 39.31 22.22 170
Dynamic 2 12738.96 21.13 33.45 16.09 0
Another index in the table is E(TT - FFTT),2  which captures the expected squared difference 
between travel time and free flow travel time in each time slot. This index measures the overall 
performance of each tolling policy in terms of consumer travel time, and assigns a higher penalty 
to those time slots with high travel times. Among the cases with HOT lane, E(TT - FFTT)2  is the 
highest in Static 2 since more travelers use the middle time slot on the regular lane. In comparing 
Dynamic 1 and Dynamic 2, E(TT - FFTT)2  significantly reduces in the latter because the distribution 
of consumers among different time slots is flat and the time slots are congested.
CONCLUSIONS
The findings in this paper provide insight into congestion pricing and highway management. Upon 
arrival at a multilane highway where one lane is free and another one is subject to toll collection, a 
traveler observes the current toll and decides whether or not to enter the HOT lane. Some travelers 
are willing to change their departure times and or routes to face lower generalized costs. A user 
equilibrium method was used to determine the distribution of travelers between HOT and regular 
lanes during the peak period, and to compare the impacts of different pricing policies on traveler 
behavior. It is shown by numerical example that a planner can manage congestion levels with tolls. 
Further, a price menu currently in effect on Interstate 15 in San Diego, California, was used to show 
that the congestion level on the regular untolled lane can be reduced without loss of profit from toll 
collection. An extension of this study is to develop an optimization model to calculate a pricing 
menu in which departure rates are uniform during the peak period. A multi-objective optimization 
model that both reduces the regular lane’s congestion level and maximizes the total expected profit 
can also be developed. Finally, one can define multiple classes of travelers who have different values 
of time and disutilities of changing their departure times.
Endnotes 
1.  For a comprehensive review, the readers are referred to Kutz (1992).
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